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1. INTRODUCTION
Based on a cheap labor from the billions of population, China has been known 
to be the "workshop of the world" for a long time. However, the notion of Cheap China 
is  dismissed as  myth.  With  the  world’s  largest  manufacturing  power,  China  is  now 
emerging as one of the most influential countries both politically and economically. It 
has overtaken the USA as the world's largest economy, and it is not too much to say that 
the 21st century is "The Chinese Century (Brecken: 2011)".
One of key factors that have led the recent rise of China is a change of economic poli-
cies during the late 70s', 80's and 90': especially the Economic Reform(1978), the Open 
Door Policy(1878), the Special Economic Zones(1980), and the Go Out Policy(1999) or 
the "Win-Win" strategies. Escaping from the limitations of a closed economy, China has 
promoted international exchanges and interaction with many different countries around 
the world.
The emergence of China in the African Continent as an economic and political 
actor is the most representative and interesting case that shows China’s strategic part-
nerships with other countries. Some point out that the Chinese pragmatism will under-
mine the opportunity of self-development for African countries, making them dependent 
on China. They view China's presence in Africa is nothing more than a neocolonialism. 
However, with a deep analysis of Sino-African relationships and historical considera-
tion, it  is  hard to say that Africa is being exploited by China, but rather Africa has 
achieved a new form of self-supply through the bilateral cooperation with China (Ríos, 
2008). That is, the Dragon's motherland is offering what the Old Powers couldn't in the 
19th century: a one-to-one relationship.
As rapidly growing, China has an increasing demand for raw material.  The 
overpopulated country needs more resources to satisfy the needs of a growing middle 
class in the society and its economic development. China has experienced difficulties 
meeting the needs, so it has found a new solution: cooperating with a big continent, full 
of natural resources and in the process of development—Africa. In exchange for re-
sources, African countries obtain infrastructures, technologies, and knowledge that are 
required for their development. 
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the relationship between African 
countries and China is a win-win strategy for both. To prove this point, this essay will 
analyze  the  China’s  strategic  partnership  with  Africa;  how  China  cooperates  with 
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African countries, how this partnership has developed, and what incentives both actors 
gain from this relationship. Besides, in order to understand how China specifically in-
teracts with a country, the case study of South Africa is presented as an example. One 
main reason that South Africa is chosen among many African countries is the fact that it 
has the most advanced economy in the African continent. Based on its large size of 
economy, the country can show more dynamic interactions with China than others. In 
addition, with a global partnership through the BRICS, South Africa has maintained a 
long history of economic cooperation and cultural exchanges with China, embracing the 
oldest and largest Chinese community in Africa.
This essay is divided into three main blocs:
  1. General Framework of Chinese Foreign Relations
  2. China-Africa Relations
  3. A Case study of China and South Africa Relations
The first bloc, General Framework of Chinese Foreign Relations, focuses on explaining 
China's history of foreign relations, migration, and economy. The purpose of this bloc is 
to establish a background that can help to understand how China has changed its atti-
tudes toward other countries and why China's partnership with Africa is based on mutu-
al benefits. The following chapter consists of different cooperation programs between 
China and Africa: the first Sino-African cooperation programs, the win-win target, and 
other trade and investment programs. The goal of this bloc is to introduce China’s for-
eign policy in Africa and its impacts, and to describe how it has developed over time. 
The last section is the case study of South Africa. The analysis will review (1) the polit-
ical and diplomatic relationships, (2) the investment and trade, and (3) the social im-
pacts of Chinese migrations into South Africa. Finally, this paper will conclude with an 
overview of the research and it will be provided and answer to the win-win partnership 
hypothesis.
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<< 冷静观察、 稳住阵脚、 沉着应付、韬光养晦、 善于守拙、 决不当头, 有所作
为。>>1
“Observe calmly; secure our position; remain calm coping with affairs; conceal our 
capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; never claim leader-
ship; but accomplish somewhat”
Deng Xiaoping’s “28 Characters Strategy”
 lěngjìng guānchá, wěnzhù zhènjiǎo, chénzhuó yìngfu, tāoguān yǎnghuì, shànyú shǒuzhuō, juébùdāngtóu, yǒusuǒ zu1 -
òwéi.
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2. GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF CHINESE    
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Chinese government’s foreign policies in the 21th century are constructed with 
a special attention to achieve a mutual benefit with its partner countries and always fol-
low the rule of non-intervention in the domestic affairs. In contrast with other powers as 
European countries, which prefer to interact with democratic countries, China puts less 
emphasis on political preferences of its partners and attempts to build a relationship 
based on the condition of a peaceful partnership. This generous approach contradicts 
with the traditional ones used by Western countries, and it can be seen as an alternative 
of the Washington Consensus. Accordingly, the purpose of this section is to review the 
history of the Chinese foreign relations with regard to understand why China does not 
follow the traditional way of holding foreign relations when it searches for a new part-
nership. The discussion starts from the end of the Second World War to the present time. 
After the Second World War, Japanese withdrew from China, and the conflicts between 
Nationalists and Communists soon ended. Four years later, in 1949, Mao Zedong pro-
claimed the founding of the People's Republic of China, which can be seen not only as a 
change of government but also as a change of the ideology. Until then, the Chinese in-
ternational behavior and way of establishing foreign affairs were first conditioned by 
China's dynasties following the 天下 or "All Under Heaven" order, and after tied to the 
European Countries being a sub-colony for some of them. After the establishment of a 
united nation ruled by a proper Han Chinese government, the aim of the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) was to build a self-sufficient China free of wars or occupations and 
to combine communism, patriotism, and internationalism altogether in order to range 
with the Great Powers. 
Accordingly, the 50's and 60's are a period of catch up in all aspects. In terms 
of international relations, Premier Mao purged all the western economic and political 
presence from China and chose to take part of the Soviet bloc but with an equal status 
instead of being just another satellite country of the URSS. He also threaded to use mili-
tary resources to take back Taiwan and sent the army to fight in the Korean War in favor 
of the communist’s power in Korea. Later, China signed in the Bandung Conference 
(1955) the "10 Points Principles": refusing any kind of colonialism or to serve to any 
interest of the Big Powers, not interfering in other nations’ affairs, and promoting the 
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cooperation between countries. Following the Bandung Participles , China constructed 2
its foreign relations basing them with the Participles and they still follow these stan-
dards. 
  Later, in the frame of the Cold War, as the URSS got a peaceful coexistence 
with the USA, Chinese government decided to split its country from the new moderate 
version of socialism of the Soviet Union. This decision was taken to achieve a socialist 
internationalism (1960) and to step aside from what Mao considered a damaged social-
ism. This movement, which was more revolutionary, searched to establish a world free 
of capitalism, human exploitation, and imperialism. plus, the Vietnam War implied a 
diplomatic isolation and military conflict with both of the main world powers of the 
Cold War. Furthermore, with the Cultural Revolution in 1966, China denounced all the 
Western Powers as imperialists and called for a revolution from the rest of the world, 
and the animosity in their relations strongly intensified (Chen, 2005). 
This political strategy had a positive impact on developing countries which 
seek for any opportunity to cease their economic dependence from the European Coun-
tries, URSS or USA and to achieve more autonomy. China, in that moment, did not have 
the same economic and technological capability as the Westerns Powers to properly aid 
all those countries. It was still developing itself as well, so only the poorest States were 
able to establish economic and diplomatic ties with the communist country. The CCP 
mostly carry through its  Outward Direct  Investment (ODI) in African countries like 
Zambia, Ghana or Benin; in the Asian States like Myanmar, North Korea, and Cambo-
dia or Latin America like in Cuba.  Some of those countries even decided to banish the 
Westerns' presence in favor of a Sino-alliance (Dessein, Bart, 2014; and Lam, Katy N.: 
2017).  From this global insurgency, China was little by little gaining a higher status in 
the international context, praised from some and despised by many others. 
  Somehow, China ends the 60's surrounded by a hostility belt, with tensions in 
the Vietnam War, and India in the South, an enraged Taiwan in the East, and a frontier 
war with the Soviet Union in the North(1969) that attempted to destroy its nuclear facil-
ities. Against this backdrop, CCP had to rethink its foreign policy in order to get some 
help facing the URSS. Despite the political differences, China initiated the well-known 
"Ping-Pong Diplomacy"(1970) with the USA, which not only later would content the 
 Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (CVCE).(-). "Final Communiqué of the Asian-African conference of 2
Bandung  (24  April  1955)".  Last  review  29/12/2016  from:  http://franke.uchicago.edu/Final_Communique_Ban-
dung_1955.pdf
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URSS threat, but also shift all its foreign relations with the western world, thanks to the 
"Shanghai Communiqué" agreement (1972). 
Later, in 1976, Mao Zedong passed away, which was an important event in 
Chinese history because it was not only a change of leadership, but also a shift in the 
paradigm of "Chinese way”. While the spirit of Maoism still survived, China with Deng 
Xiaoping as a Chairman transformed in many fields. For example, the foreign policy 
was renewed and the main characteristic was to share an affinity with the same ideology 
as China wasn't important anymore. As long as other countries could contribute some-
how to China's development and carry out all the business in a peaceful way, they were 
totally welcomed. 
In terms of economy, since 1978 and throughout the 80's, the CCP initiated the 
"Open Door Policy" which consisted of economic reforms, the spread of international 
cooperation, the establishment of the Special Economic Zones (SEZ), and the Coastal 
Open Cities to catch foreign investment. The aim was to modernize its economy, im-
prove Chinese people's quality of life and catch up all the technology lagged behind 
other  nations.  The  facilities  that  China  granted  searching  to  attract  ODI  effectively 
worked. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which was very low in the past, increased 
exponentially after the "Open Door Policy". For example, the USA foreign direct in-
vestment in 1983 was 1.7 billion dollars and in 1988 rose up to 5.3 billion dollars and in 
1991 it reached 11.4 billion (Wei, Shang Jin: 1995). The FDI took different shapes apart 
from money, such as "Compensation trade" exchanging machines for the output pro-
duced, or joining oil explorations. Within a decade, China started to be considered the 
world's factory. 
The "Open Door Policy" was also an opportunity for all overseas Chinese to 
return with their knowledge achieved from abroad (Wang Cangbai, Wong Siu-Lun, and 
Sun Wenbin: 2006) and furthermore to actively invest in the capital and development in 
their homeland. At the same time, it allowed the mainland Chinese to move abroad to 
the USA to work in some corporations creating transnational labor market flow (Yang, 
Philipe: 2006). With all the economic power that emerged from the FDI, China showed 
more active participations in the international community, including joining the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1989 and the Association of South-East  Asia Nations 
(ASEAN) in 1991. In 1992, China restored its relations with Russia and continued some 
cooperation with South America and African countries (Ba: 2003). 
  Worldwide trade of China was intensified in the 90's. In 1991-1992, the CCP 
readjusted the Chinese market to meet the international trade standards, of which the 
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result was a great diversity of trade partners raising its importance in the global society. 
Some examples are the elimination of the import license in some goods, the cancellation 
of the import tax, and lowering the trade tariff rates by a significant amount. The main 
business participants were the Asian countries followed by the USA and the European 
Union(Zhang Jianhong and van Witteloostuijn, Arjen: 2004). With the growth of the 
trade in China, in 1993 and 1994, the government implemented more open policies to 
establish a corporative system, to assure a macroeconomic control of the market, and to 
promulgate an economic legislation. Later, China created the Bank of China and the 
Export-Import  Bank  of  China  in  order  to  help  the  effectiveness  of  the  commerce 
(González-García: 1996). 
  While,  in the 80's,  the Chinese government helped the foreigners’ invest in 
China, in 2000, it encourages the local state-owned trading companies to expand their 
influence abroad. The "Go Out Policy"(1999) was designed to help the country to be 
more independent from other countries' help and to be more influential in the world. 
Thanks to this strategy, thousands of entrepreneurs were able to move to other countries 
to start a business, and this can be regarded not only as an opportunity for China to start 
economic relations with other countries but also, because all the investment returns to 
the  Motherland  in  shape  of  money,  as  financial  support  projects  or  modernization 
(Boldurukova: 2014). 
  The  21st  century  is  also  a  golden  age  for  China  in  terms  of  international 
cooperation and economic investment. While it is still the recipient of investment from 
the economic powers around the world, China has grown up to be an active investor and 
a cooperative actor. Therefore, we find those countries with cultural similarities or rich-
es in natural resources as the first who benefits from the Chinese financing (Kumar, Yap: 
2011).  The dragon's motherland holds with Asia-Pacific countries developing a free-
trade area (with ASEAN), with African countries formalizing trade, aid and investment 
relations  (FOCAC)  and  with  Latin  America  (Reardon,  Timmer,  Barrett,  Berdegué:
2003). 
  As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the main aim of China’s foreign 
policy is to ensure an economic stabilization and strengthen the ties with developing 
countries always following a mutual benefit and non-interference in the domestic affairs 
of the partner country. Taking into account all this historical context and China's politi-
cal and cultural status quo, it is easy to understand why China takes a different approach 
from western countries  when trading with African, South American, and South Asia 
countries. China, with the ambition to set up a new model of trade and cooperation 
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based on trust, equality, win-win, and non-intervention policies, as it will be shown in 
the next section, China is trying to build a new stage in the international affairs and eco-
nomic relations.
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3. CHINA-AFRICA RELATIONS
For the start of discussion over the development Sino-African relations today, 
the historical review of their interactions is necessary. The history of China and Africa’s 
relations can be traced back to 8th century, when the seafarer Du Huang reached the 
Arabian coast of Africa, or around the year 1320, when the cartographer Zhu Shiben 
completed a map of the African continent with an exceptional precision. Although these 
two personages are notably important, the most emblematic person of the Sino-Africa 
interaction is Zheng He(Snow: 1988), a navigator, administrator, eunuch and diplomat 
who began seven maritime expeditions from 1405, which were led to the discovery of 
Ormuz Strait, the Red Sea and the eastern coasts of southern Africa. Ming dynasty ex-
panded its commercial routes by earth and sea from the Middle East to the East Coast of 
Africa, (Fairbank: 1968), but ended in 1712 with the Qing dynasty, which prohibited the 
emigration of the Chinese population. It won’t be until the mid-20th century that these 
relations began in earnest.
Traditionally, African countries have been exploited by the European countries 
and the United States, but, in the past half century, they shifted from those relations in 
order to build and stabilize and an economic growth. China was one of the new eco-
nomical  actors  that  took advantage  of  this  shift  and  started,  as  Deborah  Brautigam 
shows  in  her  book  Rising  China:  Global  Challenges  and  Opportunities(Brautigam: 
2011) , China granted economical and technical agreements or loans from 1960 starting 3
with Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, Mali or Somalia and since then, adding more countries to 
the list every year. One thing to remember is that the mid-20th century is distinguished 
by the Cold War (1947-1991) and there was a strong competition between the USA and 
the URSS, as well as between the communism and the socialism. By the end of the 
1980, most of African countries made some cooperation agreements with China (Eisen-
berg: 2012-1-1), deciding whether to step aside from the Western colonies or to with-
draw the capitalist and the socialist blocks. From this perspective China expanded its 
influence around the continent.
Nowadays,  the  African  countries  have  focused  their  attention  toward  new 
economic actors apart from China, in the global context such as Brazil or India (Song-
we, Moyo: 2011).  And not only the partners are new, even the way of developing the 
economic relationships have their own characteristics. 
 Table “ Years of new aid commitments, China to Africa, 1960–2007” in the annex, Section 1.3
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The main strategy that China has taken for Sino-African relations is a win-win 
model that is intended to build up cooperative partnership and investment projects and, 
at the same time, to secure a strong economy-based diplomacy and potential markets for 
the  Chinese  entrepreneurs  and  companies(Sutter:  2006).  The  win-win  model  is  ex-
plained in the following section. 
3.1. TARGET: WIN-WIN
As it has been mentioned in the previous section, the main feature of China’s 
method of interaction with another country is the win-win strategy. An objective de-
scription of a win-win situation is provided by Karen M. Sutter in her comment “Chi-
na’s Win-Win Trade Policy” in The China Business Review (Sutter: 2006), explaining 
that this strategy follows five standard rules to conceive the cooperation policies. The 
first one is the “mutual benefit”, represented by the concept “win-win”, accomplished 
by negotiating the market importation and exportation. The second rule is the “devel-
opment first” mission: localizing some industries in the partner’s country; purchasing 
the surplus and incentive based on the quality rather the quantity. The next one is to es-
tablish a consulting mechanism to solve any issues as quickly as possible. The forth is 
the equal consultation, finding a consensus; and the last, a no-politicization of the trade 
issues, to split economical and business issues from political affairs.
Bearing this description in mind, we return to the historical construction of 
China-Africa relations and the Chinese Framework of Foreign Relations. The African 
countries wished for new trade partners in spite of shifting from the Western Powers and 
growing their  economies.  China was surrounded by the hostility  belt  with the Viet-
namese War, Taiwan, India in the South and the URSS in the north, and therefore, it 
needed new allies.
Hence, China entered into the trading partnership game in the early 60’, with 
the 10 visits of the Premier Zhou Enlai to different African Countries. He announced the 
“Five Principles ” to guide China’s relations with Arab and African nations, assuring an 4
anti-imperialism position of China and also the “Eight Principles ” to explain the Chi5 -
nese loans and economic and technological agreements. These principles were designed 
to compete the capitalist and socialist blocks, offering an approach of “equal and mutual 
benefit” instead of the Western traditional “master”, searching for the engagement of the 
 The “Five Principles” are compiled in the Section 2 of the Annex.4
 The “Eight Principles” are compiled in the Section 3 of the Annex.5
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African Countries even if in the start their financing capacity was very low. During this 
decade, infrastructures including hospitals, conference centers, and stadiums were built 
in several African countries to show support for the African independence. The African 
countries started to engage in the aid agreements between the ’60 and the 1998, ending 
with South Africa as the latest enrollment. To return the favor, in 1971, 26 African coun-
tries voted in favor for the comeback of China in the United Nations (Li:2007,3,3). 
Until the 2000’s, the aids from China had increased due to the FDI that was 
promoted by the “Open Door Policy” (1978) reform. From that moment, China became 
the most important economic partner for Africa. Africa was in a low development stage 
and urged for the demand of infrastructure and some trade to energize the economy 
(Sun: 2014), but did not have much to offer in exchange apart from the natural resources 
and the labor force. Therefore, the Chinese government exchanged interest-free loans 
and credits or infrastructures (“Angola Mode” agreement) for mineral resources, energy 
and oil. With this mode of engagement, Africa was able to offer a supply of resources 
and start stimulating its markets and, meanwhile, this market-driven trade allowed Chi-
na to satisfy its huge need of raw materials with cheap imports, the win-win situation 
occurred. 
Nowadays  China’s  diplomacy  still  respects  a  no-interference  in  African 
countries’ internal affairs and preaches for a “selfless” intention to provide development 
model without exploiting the African resources and business (Africa Research Bulletin: 
2006). However, after 2000’ data reveals, as we can observe in the article of Phineas 
Bbaala “Emerging Questions on the Shifting Sino-Africa Relations: ‘Win-Win’ or ‘Win-
Lose’?” in the African Development (Bbaala: 2015-03), some deviations, the “8 Princi-
ples” that defended an “equal and mutual benefit” status, changed. For example, imports 
from China to the African countries and the exports from those are not equally balanced 
nor in the same condition between them. This irregularity appears when Bbaala says 
that from one side, in 2009 the 60 per cent of the Chinese exports were destined to 
South Africa (21 per cent), Egypt (12 per cent), Nigeria (10 per cent), Algeria (7 per 
cent), Morocco (6 per cent) and Benin (5 per cent); but in the other hand, the 70 per cent 
of the importations from the African continent comes from just four countries:Angola 
(34 per cent), South Africa (20 per cent), Sudan (11 per cent) and Republic of Congo (8 
per cent). 
Another data that will help to understand how big is the Chinese commitment 
in contrast with other countries of the World is given in Brautigam’s research on Chi-
nese development Aid in Africa (Brautigam: 2011). The expert reports that in 2008, the 
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Chinese official development assistance (ODA) was around 1.2 billion of dollars while 
the ODA provided from, France, the World Bank or the USA was 3.4 billion of dollars; 
4.1 billion of dollars and 7.2 billion dollars, respectively. Then, it can be observed that 
the help provided from China to China is not as big as it was expected. Nevertheless, 
there still exists some evidence that the Chinese government continues the economic 
mutual help with different programs, as we can see in the next part.
3.2. FIRST COOPERATION PROGRAMS
There  is  some  historical  evidence  that  shows  China-African  economic 
cooperation goes back to 500 years ago, but it was not until China could get some eco-
nomic foundation that could carry out some business. According to Adiso, Sharkey and 
Okorafo, the business connection between Chin and Africa can be divided in three peri-
ods. The first one is called “coolie trade” and goes from 1850 to 1950. This coolie trade 
was related to colonial labor and focused on mining, railway construction and plantation 
with small-scale exports. The second phase goes from 1960 to 1980 when China shifted 
away from the coolie trade to get some political relations and offered aid to Africa with 
the intention to build a “South-South” connection. In the context of the Cold War, the 
People’s Republic of China challenges the main power countries setting down those 
equal relations in order to push the market liberalization, the establishment of special 
economic zones, and direct investment. The final step goes from 1990 to the present 
time and the main interactions between China and African countries are in the oil ex-
traction, mining and construction areas (Adiso, Sharkey, Okorafo: 2010). Even if the 
programs are focused in the extraction field, the third phase is also the period of the 
“Going Out” for the Chinese Companies, so in this third phase, not only the government 
can offer programs of cooperation, but also banks and companies do it too. 
Regarding the  second phase,  the  main  symbol  of  this  period  was  the  con-
struction of the Tazara (Tanzania-Zambia) railway which was built between 1970 and 
1975, in an afro-pessimism context due to all the indebtedness after breaking with the 
Western powers’ bounds. This railway was meant to be built to connect Zambia’s Kapiri 
Mposhi to Tanzania’s Dar Es Salaam, but the financing was a problem, and the World 
Bank and Western countries refuted the idea to help in the finance of the train. The 
Chairman Mao Zedong took the initiative to support the project with 405 million dol-
lars. The cooperation program included the railway construction, the equipment and ex-
perts on the field, the buildings and workshops needed for the construction and a train-
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ing school. The program finally was an interest-free loan and the amount of 143 million 
dollars repayable in thirty years (Shelton and Kabemba: 2012). 
 The  third  phase  includes  several  modern  cooperation  plans,  such  as  re-
habilitation of farms or implementation of new factories. The most relevant item is the 
implementation of special economic zones (SEZ) in five different countries of Africa. 
The SEZ are characterized as a limited part of fully-industrialized area with a special 
administration that lessened the tax to encourage foreign investment, which was guided 
by the Chinese government, the local government, and one big Chinese company with 
an expertise in the field. These SEZ have been placed in Zambia, Egypt, Nigeria in Lek-
ki and Ogun, Mauritius and Ethiopia. The Chinese government is in charge of the funds 
and the marketing of the SEZ in China. The Chinese companies design the business 
models.  The African Governments  provides incentives for  the development of  these 
SEZ and regulate its activities (Brautigam and Xiaoyang: 2011). 
As observed, the outline of every phase changes depending on the historical context. 
Today, even the international cooperation is organized between Africa and China, as it 
will be explained in the next point.
3.3. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
The  Sino-African  cooperation  does  not  stop  in  the  national  level.  It  has 
expanded to the multi-national cooperation with the foundation of the Forum of China-
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which involves all the African states and China; and also 
in a global level, the South-South Cooperation, where developing countries held eco-
nomic alliances together. 
3.3.1. FOCAC 
The  FOCAC  convention  was  founded  in  2000  and  was  introduced  as  a 
development partnership. Following the Win-Win movement, all the FOCAC relations 
are accorded in terms of no-intervention in internal affairs. The main aim of the forum is 
to establish a long term cooperative relationship between the African countries and Chi-
na. It also focuses in peace affairs, security, diplomacy, cultural exchange, and devel-
opment. The conferences of FOCAC take place every three years, and they are held in 
Africa and China alternately. 
The  forum  has  been  under  a  process  of  progression.  Since  2006,  every 
conference increases the extent of the commitment made in the last forum, and these 
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can have deadlines or be cumulative. For example, the commitment of China in invest-
ment rose from five billion dollars in 2006, to ten billion dollars in 2009 and to twenty 
billion dollars in 2012 (United Nations Development Programme China:2015-14).  It 
also gradually increases the zero-tariff treatment to exports from developing countries, 
setting up agricultural demonstration centers and hospitals, or placing the Special Eco-
nomic Zones. Every FOCAC has twelve priorities areas of cooperation that can change 
between different conferences. The most common priorities are energy and natural re-
sources,  agriculture,  climate change, finance, trade,  development assistance and debt 
relief,  investment and enterprise cooperation, education, public health, infrastructure, 
think tanks, academia and technology or industrialization.
Although the  FOCAC is  very  important  for  the  bilateral  relations  between 
China and Africa, it is not the only partnership forum that China attends. China also has 
partnerships like the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Coop-
eration Forum; the Forum of China and the Community of Latin American and Car-
ibbean States or ASEAN+3. The investment made can be less important but, still, FO-
CAC is a useful tool that empowers the connection not only between China and Africa 
but also within African countries.
3.3.2. SOUTH—SOUTH COOPERATION
The  South-South  Cooperation  (SSC)  initiative  arose  from  the  Bandung 
Conference in 1955, where development countries and ex-European-colonies assembled 
to promote collaboration and global interdependence with a mutual benefit without any 
obligation or tension caused for colonialism. Even if the first cooperation collaborations 
started after the Bandung Conference, the idea of the SSC was not strongly activated 
until the 90’s when the advanced developing countries could offer sustainable and low 
cost solutions to other less developed countries. For instance, India sent pool expertise 
to African farmers to deal with the access water with boreholes. Instead of asking a 
Western country of some expensive engineers, the countries preferred to ask to other 
developing countries. 
This cooperation model does not have a specific basic model of exchange or 
trade since the economic growth and various sizes of the former countries. Then, the 
most common way of helping each other in terms of SSC is a financial aid and devel-
opment assistance or trade. Because most of the advanced developing countries under-
stand the less developing countries’ precariousness, nearly all of the SSC countries pre-
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fer to offer a knowledge transfer or a technical cooperation instead of financial projects 
(Kakonge: 2014). 
The main role of China in this international interconnectivity network is to 
boost the less developed countries (LDC) with several cooperation models: large infra-
structures, the promotion of the establishment of sustainable Chinese businesses that 
can bring some knowledge to the local workers or that respect environmental issues and 
labor rights or regional engagement with forums for the poverty reduction or the climate 
change (United Nations Development Programme: 2015). These infrastructures can be 
research centers for the climate change, hospitals, funding for Chinese companies to es-
tablish a Chinese factories, railways, routes, and etc. 
Due to the exchange of infrastructures for natural resources between African 
countries and China, the dragon’s motherland has been accused of neo-colonialism. In 
some perspective, the collaboration programs might look unequal but, as augmented in 
the research report by Hanauer and Morris (Hanauer and Morris: 2014) called “Chinese 
Engagement in Africa”, most of the African countries can just offer natural resources to 
trade, like oil or minerals, so most of the western countries do not consider to do any 
investment in countries like Nigeria or Angola, for example. The thing is, Chinese pri-
vate sector is interested in low-cost manufacturing force and African countries require 
investment and job creation, so at the end, a bilateral beneficial relationship can work. 
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4. SINO—SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS
The  Sino-South  African  partnership  is  particularity  important  since  South 
Africa is the largest economy in the African Continent and shows more dynamism in 
terms of cooperation than other regions of Africa. Moreover, South Africa is the house 
of the largest Chinese community and, as mentioned in the introduction, its engagement 
with China expands to the multinational level as working as partners in the International 
System with the BRICS group. Many historical and economic factors have made influ-
ences in the construction of this strategic partnership. Therefore, this bloc will introduce 
the main characteristics of the Sino-South African relations. 
The first steady contacts between China and South Africa occurred during the 
last  decades  of  the  19th  century  and the  beginning of  the  20th  century.  Some small 
groups from the southern coast of China and some that before established in Mauritius 
islands, moved to South Africa with the aspiration of finding diamonds and gold. They 
started to work with the already settled Boer Republics and British Colonies and, these 
small groups soon became thousands of people.  They were formally recruited by the 
mining companies that arranged an agreement with the representatives of the Imperial 
China.  However,  as  the  colonies’ governments  decided to  repatriate  all  the  Chinese 
workers in 1905, only a few of them remained and stayed in Johannesburg (Alden and 
Wu: 2014-199). During the following decades, the relations of the Republic of China 
with South Africa were strictly subject to its relations with the British Colonies. Later, 
with civil war between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party during the 
Second World War, the South African officials made connections with the Kuomintang 
and the South African Communist Party, which was aligned with the URSS and sup-
ported the Chinese communism.
Nevertheless,  when  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  broke  with  the  URSS 
socialism in 1960, searched other groups to ally. Then the Chinese Communist Party 
built up ties with the Pan-African Congress (PAC) and the Union for the Total Indepen-
dence of Angola (UNITA) while, at the same time, the URSS was supported by the 
People’s  Movement for  the Liberation of  Angola (MPLA) and the African National 
Congress (ANC). The animosity did not stop until  the end of the Apartheid regime, 
when South Africa found itself in a diplomatic isolation situation and was looking for 
new partners to engage with. China was considered as a good option and, even if the 
Kuomintang supported the ANC during the Apartheid, China was expanding its influ-
ences around the world. In the end, the ANC decided to grant the two governments with 
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a “dual recognition”. Beijing and Taipei entered in a competition for attention from the 
African National Congress. Seeking for international support, both countries competed 
in aid, investment and trade. Finally, South Africa could not ignore China’s economic 
power and committed for Beijing’s recognition. In January 1st, 1998, the formal and of-
ficial diplomatic relations within South Africa and China were set up. In 1999, Nelson 
Mandel visited China to thank China’s support during the Apartheid and praised for the 
promoting of a mutual benefice.
Since then, South Africa and China worked in their partnership to get a win-
win situation. The commitment of their relations is the result of the engagement of the 
ANC with the PRC along with several number of actors such State-Owned Enterprises, 
Chinese banks and private companies and furthermore, the migration and the intercul-
tural exchange. In this perspective, the analysis of their relations can be divided into 
three main parts: politic relations, economic relations, and social relations.
4.1. POLITICAL RELATIONS
South  Africa  and  China  governments  officially  established  their  diplomatic 
collaboration on the 1st January of 1998. Since then, the two countries worked on bilat-
eral  cooperation with the aim to maximize their  economic benefits.  For this  reason, 
when talking about their political relations, it is important to mention about the concept 
of economic diplomacy (Putman: 1988). The economic diplomacy refers to the spread 
of the domestic interests through the economy achieving an international balance to-
wards the other countries. One example is the One-China Policy. The Republic of China 
was a traditional ally of South Africa’s government, but The People’s Republic of China 
offered better commercial chances than Taiwan, gaining the support of ANC for the 
One-China Policy (Grimm, Kim, Anthony, Attwell and Xiao:2014)
Following  this  model,  the  diplomatic  relations  between  both  governments 
started with a bi-national commission, the Pretoria Declaration (2001), with an intention 
to develop investment and trade in the mining, manufacturing and the raw materials ar-
eas. In order to keep the security and the cooperation, PRC and ANC agreed on the non-
intervention  principle,  and  as  a  result,  the  second  bi-national  commission  in  2004 
searching for a “strategic partnership”, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), 
was  achieved.  With  this  partnership,  South  African  government  decided  to  grant  a 
“marked status” to China in order to facilitate the bilateral partnership. Through this 
second commission, both governments reached the following steps after the exploitation 
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of natural resources: the agricultural trade and the cultural and educational exchanges. 
This period of formalizing diplomatic ties was quickly reflected in the economic and 
trade engagement.  Both countries  especially  focused in the extraction of  natural  re-
sources, manufacturing, international security, and promotion of the development in all 
levels. Their foreign ministries consulted each other often and collaborated together in 
the agricultural exports and the education.
However, the first disagreement between both presidencies arose when China 
started holding the FOCAC and participating in the G-8. The South African president 
Mbeki considered that China is interested in Africa only as a supplier and this compli-
cates the relations between him and the president Hu Jintao. The tensions between both 
actors grew further as China developed cooperation movements with Zimbabwe, Ango-
la and Sudan. The interests of Beijing seemed to be divided in eyes of Pretoria, and the 
security hostility increased and South African businesses started to lose contracts from 
the Chinese clients. 
The situation changed with the exit of the President Mbeki form the ANC in 
December of 2009. The following president, Kgalema Moyhlanthe worked to restore 
the relationship with China lost during the last years of Mbeki presidency (Alden and 
Wu: 2014-199). 
Later, China decided to answer the problem with the Beijing Declaration in 
2010. The objective of this declaration is to support each other in the International Sys-
tem with more the cooperation, trade and investment measures (Alden and Wu:2014) 
and with a presidential change from South Africa, the relations stayed dynamic. The 
Beijing Declaration became a tie strengthener and helped the two countries to achieve 
some bilateral measures.
Next,  with  Jacob Zuma’s  presidency,  South Africa  engaged 38 bilateral  cooperation 
agreements with China on trade, mineral exploration, investment and agriculture. With 
the financial crisis ahead, Jacob Zuma’s opted to adopt a Chinese-style development 
state and called for China to set some domestic economic measures and policies. Main-
taining a mature relation started by the Beijing Declaration, China encourages the South 
Africa  to  adhere  into  the  BRIC in  order  to  improve  its  international  position.  This 
movement let China gain a partner inside this coalition group. 
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4.1.1. CHINA AND SOUTH AFRICA AS BRICS’ PARTNERS
In  2010  China  aimed  to  cooperate  with  South  Africa  in  several  different 
international fields, like in the United Nations, the G-20, the BRIC, international Fo-
rums  (FOCAC)  with  the  objective  to  make  South  Africa  more  visible  in  the  In-
ternational System and to give it the opportunity to, from one side, to give her voice 
about its country, and from the other side, representing Africa’s interests. China also 
wanted Africa in the BRICS group to reinforce its proposals since the African country 
and China shared a consolidate relationship and sometimes seek for the same objectives 
in the International System. 
In late December of 2010, South Africa enrolled the BRICS group and quickly 
accepted the idea of a BRICS New Development Bank proposed in the BRICS Summit 
in New Delhi 2012. The BRICS countries share a similar situation of development, so it 
is easier to approach and create some policies and measurements for themselves in this 
cooperative framework.
In the BRICS context,  China and South Africa’s strategy pursues to fix the 
inequalities and disproportion in the global distribution of power. In other words, they 
both want to decentralize the focus of power that the Western Powers and gain multipo-
larity through better representation of the rest of the world. Another point pursued by 
South Africa and China is the spread of sustainable development among all the citizens 
of the world, doing a Top-bottom change and giving examples from big corporations 
and the governments itself. 
It  is believed that South Africa’s participation in the BRIC countries would 
have a negative side-effect of neo-colonialism from the other countries of the Partner-
ship, as Africa can offer plenty of natural resources and due the difference of economic 
and political dimensions with the other BRICS members. However, South Africa has 
shown that fair bilateral agreement can be made, and also it can ensure its financial part 
for the infrastructure projects of the New Development Bank (Naidu:2015). 
4.1.2. SOFT POWER
One of the China’s strategies to gain the trust and the collaboration of South 
Africa is using a “charm offensive”, also known as Soft Power. The concept of soft 
power appeared during the Cold War and was used by the USA and by the URSS as 
well, to sell their own image to the country that they wanted to persuade. There are three 
kinds of power: coercion, payment and attraction (Fijalkowski: 2011- 2). Soft power 
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belongs to the attraction, the power to convincing others and it works through the cul-
ture, the values, the foreign policies or with direct assistance to the other country. 
The  Chinese  model  of  foreign  relations  follows  non-interference  into  the 
domestic affairs and always pursuing the win-win situation, so the main action taken in 
South Africa by the Chinese government is the development assistance in the no-eco-
nomical field. One example of “charm offensive” would be the establishment of Confu-
cius Institute in order to explain the Chinese culture thought the study of the standard 
Chinese, and, from these Confucius Institutes, grant students with scholarships to stu-
dents. Another kind of scholarship granted to South African students thanks to the soft 
power is a short-term training for teachers in China. 
Some other  ways  of  soft  power  are  the  construction  of  infrastructures  like 
railways, airports or hospitals. The construction projects gives a value-add to the since it 
not only offers a new building or infrastructure but also working opportunities for the 
South African society. Also, the knowledge transfer from Chinese expertise or the train-
ing schools for farming and mining or the medical attendance or information about how 
to prevent VHI (Jianbo, Xiaomin: 2009).
Because  of  the  emergent  economic  power  of  China,  its  soft  power  can  be 
covered and it might look as less important, but one of the pillars of the Chinese part-
nership with South Africa is the trust transferred by the charm offensive.
4.2. ECONOMIC RELATIONS
The economic  engagement  between China  and  South  Africa  has  given  big 
results in a very short time. Since 2008, only a decade after the Official Diplomatic 
Recognition (1998), the Chinese trade with South Africa had a sharp increase in the an-
nual growth up to the 77% in 2011, which can be understood as China being for South 
Africa the first export and import economical partner. It’s hard to analyze and express 
the economic data between the both countries since 1998 because the statistic inconsis-
tencies, trade via third markets, smuggling, currency fluctuation, the use of intermedi-
aries, etc. Nevertheless, every year there is more dedication for the trade regulation and 
data collection.
The Chinese and South African trade can be divided in three main parts: direct 
trade and investment between the governments, trade from private companies which 
access to the trade market through the government or the Chinese banks; or investment 
from Chinese banks, as it will be explained below.
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4.2.1 TRADE AND INVESTMENT PROJECTS BETWEEN GOVERMENTS 
The economic relation between the Chinese and South African governments 
changed with the fast growth in trade. This fact is due to the South African recognition 
of China as a potential market and granting to the dragon’s motherland the market status 
in 2004.  From this point, the Chinese and South African economic relations intensified 
and improved so rapidly that China took the position of the USA as the largest bilateral 
trading partner for South Africa.  Another reason that helped China to be the largest 
partner is its survival to the global crisis. While the European countries and western or-
ganizations suffered from the financial  struggle,  China could protect its  country and 
overcome it. The impossibility for the Western countries to trade at the same level as 
before, gave China the opportunity to take their place. Thanks to this advantage, China 
exports arouse, fact that made the South African trade balance be in negative (2010) 
(Alden and Wu: 2014-199). 
Apart from the negative balance in trade, there are other concerns such as the low im-
ports by China of anything no related to minerals, metal based products, textiles, pre-
cious and semi-precious metals, stones, wood or agricultural products. From the other 
hand, China exports to South Africa value-added products, such as computers, clothing, 
vehicles and printing machinery. Therefore, the trade balance for South Africa is nega-
tive because of the high cost of the imported good from China. 
Nevertheless, there have been attempts to equalize the trade balance and solve the prob-
lem. 
Three years later, in 2013, the problem was not solved yet but both presidents 
opted  to  concentrate  their  efforts  into  the  implementation  of  bigger  supplement  of 
mechanisms programs to help the investment in other ways.
4.2.1.1. INVESTMENT
What strengthened the bilateral relations between PRC and ANC is the growth 
of  the trade in South Africa by investment and aid projects.  China’s  investment in-
creased since 1998, when the Chinese government decided to grant South Africa with 
three hundred million dollars to eight hundred millions in 2010. Despite the big amount 
registered in 2010, if it is compared with other countries’ FDI, China’s contribution be-
comes modest. For example, the South African Reserve Bank reports that the invest-
ment of China during 1998 to 2010 was 5,077 million of dollars while the USA con-
 21
tributed to South Africa with an 11,711 million dollars and Europe invested 124,269 
million of dollars. It might to be said, that China isn’t a developed country yet but it 
could easily increase it capacity of investment.
On the other hand, most of the inversions come from big Chinese companies 
are exclusively interested in the extraction sector. This investment is carry out by many 
Chinese companies with experience in the extraction field such as Zinjin Mining Group 
or Sinosteel. The mining companies are granted by the Chinese government with fund-
ing or helped by ANC with the taxes and normative. Another sector that nowadays gets 
through a rise of investment is the agricultural sector due the growing concern for food 
security within the Chinese society. However, most of the Chinese companies decides to 
focalize their investment force in the extraction sector, with is translated to a disequilib-
rium in South Africa’s other sectors.
4.2.1.2. AID
Aids are another way of doing partnership within two countries. The central 
characteristic of an aid is the transfer of resources between governments without search-
ing for a reward, having altruistic purposes. 
The main difference between investment and aid is the control of the aid by the Devel-
opment Assistance Committee (DAC) from the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). The aid program, funding, etc. is still done between both 
governments, but they must follow some norms and report about their Aid. China pro-
cures its Aid with grants, zero interest loans, debt relief and concessional loans. The 
grants are those related with the scholarships, medical teams, construction of buildings 
such as  hospitals  or  schools,  farming assistance,  aid material,  etc.  The concessional 
loans are granted by Chinese banks but are also counted as aid. 
By the end of 2009, the Chinese Government provided 37.7 billion of dollars 
in aid to foreign countries along with 15.6 billion of dollar in grants, 11.3 billion dollars 
with interest-free loans and 10.8 billion dollars on concessional loans. From all  this 
help, the 46.7 per cent is destined to Africa. Chinese government controls its aid with 
five-years plans organized by the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries in the Min-
istry of Commerce(Brautigam:2011).
4.2.1.3. FTA
Another mechanism tried by the Chinese government to get a better partnership relation 
was a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The first FTA was planned to start in 2005 and it 
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was held between the PRC’s government and the South Africa’s Department of Trade 
and Industry (Alden and Wu: 2014-199). Beijing defended that the FTA would help 
South Africa to equalize its negative trade balance, also to introduce new investment 
into the mining sector attracting important Chinese companies and generating employ-
ment for the local people. However, the ANC received advice from other countries of 
the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) to ask for more gains for its country, but 
both governments were not able to find a solution for a FTA agreement that positively 
impacted to both actors. Nowadays, there is no other FTA arranged between these two 
countries, therefore, the Chinese government used alternative ways, like the Chinese 
banks, to get along with South Africa and work on the relations between these two 
countries. 
4.2.2. CHINESE BANKS
The role of the Chinese Banks in South Africa are diversificated between the common 
offer of services to Chinese immigrants in South Africa, to the South African society 
and to middle size and small size enterprises either from China or South Africa; and 
working for big corporations and directly for Chinese Government. The Chinese banks 
as ICBC or Exim Bank not also have the responsibility to confer concessional loans to 
the South African government but also carry out financings projects. 
Sometimes, the Chinese banks also financed the local banks in order to help them to ex-
pand it influences in South Africa and Africa or just engage to offer a better funding 
coverage to the South African society. One case of these banks' engagement was the 
ICBC and the Standard Bank, one of the most important in South Africa. These two 
banks destined 400 million dollars to invest in the South African e-market (Meyer, Alao, 
Alden and Alves: 2011-103). On the other hand we have the China Exim Bank or the 
China Development Bank and, as the ICBC is in charge of the banks funding, the China 
Exim Bank and the China Development bank are focused on different finance projects. 
For example, the China Exim Bank used a 5 billion dollars to support the Chinese en-
terprises‘ development in South Africa (2010) or also offers short-term credits to Chi-
nese exporters and long-term credits to South African importers(Brautigam:2011). The 
other side, China development bank invests in house projects and infrastructures (2007) 
and also had the funding of 5.6 billion of dollars to finance 35 commercial projects with 
loans (2010)
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4.2.3. CHINESE COMPANIES
The biggest Chinese companies which the government considers appropriate to 
become a competitive multinational, are granted with the permission of offer strategic 
credits lines to support their field of action in South Africa. These strategic lines com-
bine of  export  seller’s  credits,  export  buyer’s  credits,  loans  and import  credits  with 
which can give a foundation to the local government. For example, ZTE gave a funding 
package of 10 billion dollars in 2009 for a technological project (Brautigam: 2011). 
All the companies chosen by the Chinese government are also granted with a 
direct funding from the government destined to invest in their own field of action. For 
example, Sinosteel can offer foundation in the extraction area and Hubei SFE in the 
agricultural field.
4.3. SOCIAL RELATIONS
4.3.1. HISTORY OF THE CHINESE MIGRATIONS
The social level of the relations between those two countries is represented in 
the demographic field. Migrations from China to the South African country started in 
1660, when the Dutch East India Company took Chinese convicts and slaves to work in 
the Transvaal’s mines or in the railway construction or later, with some artisan, laborers 
and contracted miners that were transported to Transvaal and then returned to China un-
til year 1910. Just some of those workers integrated to South Africa’s society and never 
returned home. 
Chinese had a small representation in the South African population but still, 
they were noticed by the government when in 1948 the National Court established the 
measures of racial segregation (Lafargue: 2012), the Apartheid, dividing the society in 
Black, White, Coloured (mixed-blood) and Indians. This last group had more sub-divi-
sions  with  the  following groups:  Malays  from Cape,  Indians,  Griqua,  Mixed-Blood 
from Cape and Chinese. The promulgate dictations of the Apartheid regime restricted to 
all non-white groups the access to the white zones, and imposed a strong segregation in 
public places; but Chinese remained in a better situation than the black population. The 
main reasons of this positive distinction were a non-enrolment of the Chinese minority 
to the political movements and thanks to their commercial representation (Park: 2009)
After the Apartheid, during the modern era, Mao Zedong sent in 1950 a group 
of 150,000 people formed by technicians and agriculturists, with the aim to consolidate 
the South Africa-China bounds. These workers were sent to build the Tanzania-Zambia 
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railway, and after the realization of this project, most of them where back to the Main-
land. Later, with the economic reforms, some Chinese entrepreneurs based their compa-
nies in South Africa willing to enlarge their fortune. 
Nowadays  the  migrations  flow  from  China  has  risen  very  quickly.  The 
principal cause of this fact is the low regularization of the immigration and the illegal 
entrance of people to South Africa.  Additionally, a big part of this immigration group 
are workers displaced to work with their companies in South Africa, or people who 
could get a visa to work in some constructions projects form the PRC. Another percent-
age comes through false visa agencies, family and friends connections or tricked by 
human traffickers (Park: 2009).  
4.3.2. CHINESE DEMOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION
In the Chinese minority in South Africa can be identified three different groups 
of population. The first  one is the South African-Born Chinese (SABC). This group 
comprises the old migrants who have never gone back to the Mainland and the Tai-
wanese citizens that moved following the same patterns. Nowadays this group repre-
sents the elite in South Africa as they hold the most important businesses.  The second 
group can be identified as the immigration flow placed in the late nineties, after the offi-
cial establishment of China-South African Diplomacy. Most of this group’s people come 
from the Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, the traditional emigrant regions of China, and 
the displacement is produced aiming for new business opportunities. This collective has 
a big significance in the South African-Chinese economic relations due most of them 
based in South Africa as wholesales ore distributors of Mainland’s products. The third 
group is formed by a wave of peasants and small-companies owners from the Fujian 
province. Most of people from this third group came through an illegal way or thanks 
friends or familiar relations, and due their lack of English, is the less integrated Chinese 
group in South Africa. 
4.3.3. XENOPHOBY
Since the migration flow of Chinese people increased in the last two decades, 
the xenophobic violence against the Chinese population also raised. In the South Africa 
history the violence against foreigners has been a topic directly related to the unem-
ployment. South Africa society is especially sensitive regarding the employment due a 
big part of the South Africa society owns little retail shops and stores and there is a big 
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competition. With the massive arrival of Chinese groups with the enough capacity to 
start little businesses, the South African society felt attack and soon appeared xenopho-
bic hatred to those who came to “take away” jobs from the South Africa people’s hands. 
Nowadays the situation for the Chinese population has changed a little bit. The 
main reason is because those little stores established by the Chinese groups in their ar-
rivals has enlarged and now are big business which offers Chinese products, therefore 
the competence between the South African products is no longer standing. The second 
main reason is the integration from these Chinese communities within the South African 
society. This integration revealed to the native population the importance of Chinese 
people as a contributor of the South African economy. With the acceptation of the Chi-
nese community, the xenophobic attacks decreased and nowadays are just a few. 
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5. CONCLUSION
In this research paper, it has been studied the China’s strategic partnership with 
Africa with a special case study of the Sino-South African relations. 
It  has  been  reviewed  the  Chinese  foreign  relations  framework  for  a  better 
understanding of the Chinese display in the African Continent and South Africa. It has 
been seen in this section that Chinese foreign relations are based in the Bandung Con-
ference’s Principles which also stands up for the non-interference on the domestics af-
fairs of the other partner country. Besides, the Chinese pursuing of a one to one relation 
comes from the abuse of the Western Colonies during the late 19th century and also, 
because the bipolar power during the Cold War. For this reason, China defends an equal 
exchange in its strategic partnership and also promotes a non-interference of domestic 
affairs.
In the followed section, it has been analyzed how China and Africa engaged 
their partnership. The first objective of China with the African continent was to get more 
partners in the International System defending the socialism and the communism in the 
framework of the Cold War. After, with the economic growth of China, the dragon’s 
motherland searched for a partner who could offer the supply of raw materials needed 
for the development of the country. 
One difference between China and the traditional colonies was that it presented 
itself as a still developing country which searched for a partnership. What the African 
Continent had found in China is an alternative partner to the traditional colonial coun-
tries, which does not care about the political nature of the countries and defends non-
interference in the domestic affairs. Through the creation of trade partnerships and also 
through some cooperation programs, China and Africa both pursued a mutual benefit or 
win-win strategy. Thus, the main target of China was to get a win-win situation through 
cooperation programs country by country, and also to encourage the partnership within 
the African countries with the use of international forum as FOCAC or through the 
South-South Cooperation movement. 
 In the last part, it has been done an analysis of the Sino and South African relations in 
political, economic and social terms. All the research has been effectuated in order to 
analyze if this partnership has achieved a win-win situation or if it is a case of neo-colo-
nialism.
After the realization of this research, it can be said that the strategic partnership 
between China and Africa, and closely, with South Africa is not a perfect win-win situa-
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tion  if  is  analyzed  searching  for  a  symmetrical  economic  gains.  Nevertheless,  this 
strategic partnership seeks for the mutual benefit and this one cannot always be find in 
symmetrical terms. As it has been observed, most of the cooperation programs between 
China and Africa or South Africa, for example, exchanges natural resources for infra-
structures. Therefore, this partnership cannot be analyzed searching for the symmetrical 
economical because the exchanged good doesn’t has the same value. Moreover, this 
partnership  is  based in  the  mutual  benefits  providing to  the  other  actor  what  really 
needs. Then we are in front of a real partnership because, even if there is sometimes that 
the two actors disagree with each other, they search for other alternatives. One example 
shown in the research of this commitment is the FTA between South Africa and China. 
South Africa disagreed so the FTA was taken back. Hence, the partnership seeks for 
what both countries need, and, even if it can be seen as an unequal or asymmetric ex-
change, it has to be remembered that China and South Africa has other options to trade. 
For example, all the African countries which political regime is a democracy can opt to 
focus their relations or establish partnership with Europe Union Countries. For those 
who do not have a democratic regime, they could trade and invest with their own neigh-
bors or countries that share the same political nature. 
The South African-Sino relations are even working in the International System 
where they support each other, for example, in the United Nations conventions or in the 
decisions between the BRICS group. With a series of events including the Brexit and 
the election of Trump as the US President, there has recently been an increasing tension 
of protectionism and lack of cooperation between countries around the world. As a new 
leading country of the world, it will be desirable for China to lead more partnerships 
and cooperation among countries as it did in the African continent.  
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7. ANNEX
7.1. SECTION 1
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Table: Years of New Aid Commitments, China to Africa, 1960-2007. From Bräutigam, Debo-
rah. (2011). «Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What, Where, Why and how much?» 
A: Anu Press (ed.) Rising China: Global Challenges and Opportunities. Bern: Golley, 
Jane and Song, Ligang, p. 203-222
7.1. SECTION 2
The Five Principles:
 
1. China supports the African and Arab peoples in their struggle to oppose imperialism 
and old and new colonialism and to win and safeguard national independence.
2. It supports the pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment by the 
Governments of the African and Arab countries.
 
3. It supports the desire of the African and Arab peoples to achieve unity and solidarity 
in the manner of their own choice.
 
4.  It  supports  the African and Arab countries  in their  efforts  to settle  their  disputes 
through peaceful consultations.
 
5. It holds that the sovereignty of the African and Arab countries should be respected by 
all other countries and that encroachment and interference from any quarter should be 
opposed.
Information from: Kane, Thomas. (2001). “China’s Foundations: Guiding Principles of 
Chinese Foreign Policy.” Comparative Strategy 20:45-55
7.3. SECTION 3
The Eight Principles:
 
1. The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual 
benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilat-
eral alms but as something mutual.
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2. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sov-
ereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any 
privileges.
 
3. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and 
extends the time limit for the repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden of 
the recipient countries as far as possible.
 
4. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to 
make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by step 
on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development.
 
5. The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects 
which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient gov-
ernments may increase their income and accumulate capital.
 
6. The Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own 
manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by 
the Chinese Government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese 
Government undertakes to replace them.
 
7. In giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it 
that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique.
 
8. The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in the recipient countries will 
have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. The Chinese 
experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.  
Information from: Kane, Thomas. (2001). “China’s Foundations: Guiding Principles of 
Chinese Foreign Policy.” Comparative Strategy 20:45-55
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